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Rebel with a Cause: The (Im)Morality of Imagawa Ryōshun
Jeremy A. SATHER
This essay examines the dissonance between contemporary accounts of 
Imagawa Ryōshun’s activities and the later Tokugawa period image of him 
as exemplar of warrior values. A critical of contemporary sources reveals that 
his is an altogether different image: that of rebel. While Ryōshun sacrificed 
twenty-five years of his life attempting to subjugate the island of Kyushu for 
the Ashikaga, things turned sour when his enemies slandered him to Ashikaga 
Yoshimitsu, who summarily dismissed him from the post of Kyushu tandai. 
Yoshimitsu’s absolutism brought him into conf lict with other powerful 
warlords like Ōuchi Yoshihiro and Ashikaga Mitsukane, both of whom in the 
end plotted rebellion. While Ryōshun disavowed any participation in the plot, 
it is reasonably clear that he did participate, if only tacitly, and even mustered 
troops before surrendering and ending his life in political exile. In order to 
justify his betrayal, he seems to have relied on ideas from Mencius to suggest 
that Yoshimitsu was an immoral ruler whose prof ligacy demanded reign 
change. Mencius gave him the opportunity to argue that the Ashikaga family 
was worthy of rule but that Yoshimitsu was not. In other words, Ryōshun 
remained loyal to the Ashikaga house, not the individual ruling it, a position 
more in line with Tokugawa ideas on loyalty than his own. His stance on reign 
change, however, was dangerous for the Tokugawa, who were concerned with 
maintaining control of the warrior class. Accordingly, Ryōshun’s betrayal was 
forgotten or ignored, leaving the image of paragon to posterity.
Keywords: Nanbokuchō, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, Ōuchi Yoshihiro, Ōei 
Disturbance, Nan Taiheiki, Imagawa Letter, Mencius, Confucianism, loyalty, 
Kyushu tandai
One of the greatest generals and poets of the fourteenth century, Imagawa Ryōshun 今川了
俊 (1326−1420?) has been considered a warrior of outstanding virtue, especially during the 
Tokugawa period (1603−1868).1 This image comes primarily from his renown as a Confucian 
intellectual and the acclaim his Imagawa jō 今川状 (Imagawa Letter, hereafter referred to 
as the Letter) received. Other evidence, however, complicates that image—specifically, his 
1 Ryōshun’s given name was Sadayo 貞世, but he took the former name following the death of the second 
Ashikaga shogun Yoshiakira 足利義詮 in 1367. For more on Ryōshun as an exemplar of Tokugawa ethics, see 
Steenstrup 1973, pp. 296−98.
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tacit involvement in an uprising against Ashikaga 
Yoshimitsu 足利義満 (1358−1408). Ryōshun as 
rebel is at odds with the aforementioned image, 
but only if we assume that ethics and loyalty are 
synonymous.
During the Tokugawa per iod eth ica l 
behavior and loya lt y were to some extent 
synonymous,  but no such idea l  obta ined 
during Ryōshun’s time, when a fundamental 
contradiction governed the relationship between 
lord and fol lower: the more ef fect ive and 
independent the warrior, the more likely he 
was to turn on his lord when presented with a 
better opportunity.2 Ryōshun understood that 
peace required a shift in this relationship. This is 
evident in his attempt at creating stronger bonds 
of loyalty between the warriors of Kyushu and 
the Ashikaga shogunate during his twenty-five 
year sojourn in the southern isle. He appears to 
have understood that Japan was standing on the 
precipice of disaster—an erosion of the social 
bonds between warrior and central government 
that would result in widespread disorder—and 
sought to arrest that process via a rigid form of 
loyalty more resembling that which obtained 
during the Tokugawa era than his own. Indeed, one of the reasons he was seen by Tokugawa 
observers as ethical was precisely because his stance on loyalty was akin to that of the 
Tokugawa period.
To understand the inconsistency between the later image of Ryōshun and 
contemporary accounts of his life, I will focus on his version of two events as recorded 
in his Nan Taiheiki 難太平記 (Criticisms of Taiheiki). The first is his appointment to the 
office of Kyushu tandai 探題 in 1370. The second is his dismissal from that post in 1395 
and subsequent involvement in the Ōei Disturbance of 1399. Despite Ryōshun’s twenty 
five years spent subjugating Kyushu for the Ashikaga, his work bred mistrust among the 
independent warlords (tozama 外様) there. He was eventually slandered and recalled to 
Kyoto. This paper will show that the actualities of Ryōshun’s life were far more ambiguous 
than the lofty opinions held of him in later ages would suggest.
One of those ambiguities I wish to explore concerns Ryōshun’s motives for 
participating in a rebellion against Yoshimitsu. A fundamental conservatism was at the 
heart of his decision to rebel. Ryōshun, like many of his peers, shared the belief that good 
government should resemble the dual polity, or kōbu seiken 公武政権, of the Kamakura 
period. The third shogun Yoshimitsu, however, departed from his forebears and sought to 
become an autocratic power in his own right, putting him at odds with men like Ryōshun 
2 See chapter 5, Conlan 2003; Friday 1996.
Figure 1. Portrait of Imagawa Ryōshun, from Zenken 
kojitsu 前賢故実  by Kikuchi Yōsai 菊池容斎.
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who had spent their lives fighting for the Ashikaga under the assumption that they would 
play a role in establishing and governing a new shogunate.
This paper will explore the reasons behind Ryōshun’s rebellious attitude and the 
contradictions that occurred as a result: his actions in Kyushu were meant to prevent 
disorder, but they were in fact a harbinger of it.3 Not only is this interesting on the micro 
level, but on the macro level it is also germane to our understanding of the ebbs and flows of 
the fourteenth century and, more broadly, to the continuities that define Japan’s history.
A Note on Nan Taiheiki and the Imagawa Letter
The title Nan Taiheiki’s implies it is a criticism of the fourteenth century war tale Taiheiki 
太平記 (Chronicle of Great Peace), which records Emperor Go-Daigo’s 後醍醐天皇 
(1288−1339) failed Kenmu Restoration of 1333−36 and the subsequent rise of the Ashikaga. 
However, there are problems with this assumption, not least that Ryōshun himself likely 
did not supply the title.4 The title has led readers to assume that the work’s purpose is a 
general critique of Taiheiki when in actuality its author is critical of its omissions regarding 
the roles of his father Imagawa Norikuni 今川範国 (1294−1384) and brother Noriuji 範氏 
in the Ashikaga’s rise to power.5 In other words, Ryōshun believed it was his duty to rectify 
the historical record regarding his family, not simply to tear down a work that he considered 
important for remembering warrior deeds.6 Indeed, regardless of the nature of his criticism, 
the fact that he even bothered to write Nan Taiheiki in the first place suggests the signifi-
cance Taiheiki had in the collective warrior memory.
More significant perhaps is the last third of Nan Taiheiki. Here we find what appears to 
be the most important part of the text, Ryōshun’s criticisms of Yoshimitsu. Ryōshun hoped 
to exonerate himself of the stigma of traitor that he incurred as a result of his subsequent 
participation in rebellion. To do so he embarked on a remonstrance of Yoshimitsu that relies 
on an unorthodox interpretation of rebellion. Understanding how he interpreted rebellion is 
essential to elucidating the reasons for the inconsistency between the image and the reality 
of Ryōshun’s life.
Integral to that goal is Ryōshun’s Imagawa Letter, a series of injunctions he purportedly 
sent to his younger brother (and later adopted son) Nakaaki 仲秋 to berate him for his 
maladministration of Suruga province. The Letter fit so well with Tokugawa rhetoric 
regarding loyalty and virtue that it helped fashion the image of Ryōshun as moral exemplar. 
Indeed, it even became standard reading for early-modern samurai, spawning a whole subset 
of educational literature.7 Nevertheless, it is not even clear whether the Letter is Ryōshun’s 
handiwork. Even if we assume that it is, the work does not advocate a new vision of ethics 
but rather represents the rise of the bunbu ryōdō 文武両道 ideal.8 The Letter’s maxims were 
easily applicable to a wide number of ethical issues, making it popular especially during the 
eighteenth century when warrior leaders sought to inculcate martial vigor and moral behavior 
3 See chapter 5, Conlan 2003, esp. p. 164.
4 Takeda 1998, p. 80; Hanafusa 2009.
5　“Without question eighty or ninety percent of Taiheiki is false. The overall storyline is not wrong, but there 
are many falsehoods about the merit of various individuals” (Hasegawa 2006, p. 423).
6 Ichizawa 2002, p. 49.
7 Steenstrup 1973, pp. 295−96; note 9, p. 296.
8 See chapter 10, Hurst 1998b; Conlan 2011a.
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in an increasingly dissipated warrior class.9 Its universal nature allowed it to stand in for 
warrior morality, which contributed to the image of Ryōshun as exemplar of warrior ethics.
However, the Letter is not a general primer on loyalty or morality for warriors but a 
guide for governance and keeping the peace specific to Ryōshun’s cultural and chronological 
milieu, and so we should be skeptical of reading it as representative of a novel or radical 
ideal of loyalty or ethics. On the other hand, the Letter is still useful, for if we posit it as at 
least representative of his ethics, we can see that he understood quite well the main issue 
plaguing the relationship between lords and followers—namely, the ease with which both 
parties were able to break bonds of fealty. In any event, the popularity of the Letter, with 
its easy-to-digest exhortations and rigid didactic tone, outstripped that of Nan Taiheiki and 
the inconsistencies it hinted at. The popularity of his Letter, and Taiheiki’s omission of the 
Imagawa’s role in the Ashikaga’s rise, both combined to help efface the nuances of Ryōshun’s 
life, rendering him a one-dimensional icon of warrior morality that disregards the very 
nuances I will explore in this paper.
Part 1: Imagawa Ryōshun—Poet in an Age of War
The Imagawa were staunch supporters of the Ashikaga throughout the Nanbokuchō period 
(1336−92), Ryōshun’s father Norikuni serving as a general and administrator to the Ashikaga 
throughout. Ryōshun would follow suit, though we have very little in the way of details 
concerning his activities during his youth. Ryōshun shows up as a shogunal administrator in 
the 1360s as chief of the bureau of samurai (samurai dokoro tōnin 侍所当人) and chief of the 
council of adjudicators (hikitsuke tōnin 引付当人).10 That decade was marked by the gradual 
solidification of authority under the second Ashikaga shogun Yoshiakira 足利義詮 (1330−67), 
who, before passing away in 1367, appointed Hosokawa Yoriyuki 細川頼之 (1329−92) 
shogunal regent (kanrei 管領) to Yoshiakira’s young son Yoshimitsu who would become 
shogun a year later at the tender age of ten. It was a pivotal time for the shogunate insofar as 
any discontinuity of leadership would provide opportunities for resistance to its authority.
Enter Ryōshun, who by that time was an experienced general and administrator, not to 
mention a member of the Imagawa, a famous collateral family of the Ashikaga. Importantly, 
he was known primarily for his skill at and love of poetry, an important trait during the 
fourteenth century when the Ashikaga valued the possession of literary skill as highly as 
military skill for governance.11 He embarked on a poetic career from a young age and was 
tutored by some of the era’s greatest poetic minds, including waka and renga master Nijō 
Yoshimoto 二条良基; Ryōshun even had a poem included in the imperial poetry anthology 
Fūga wakashū 風雅和歌集 in 1346.12 It is not far off the mark to suggest that poetry was his 
true calling and that he hoped to pursue it as a vocation while performing his administrative 
  9 Tokugawa Yoshimune 徳川吉宗 (1684−1751) sought to instill martial vigor in the samurai by ordering hunts 
and training exercises, much to the consternation of his peace-loving followers. Later, Matsudaira Sadanobu 
松平定信 (1759−1829) harped on the term bunbu ryōdō so much that it became the subject of satirical verse. 
See Hurst 1998, pp. 142−43; Iwasaki 1983, pp. 18−19.
10 Kawazoe 1964, pp. 61−70.
11 Conlan 2011a, p. 123.
12 Ryōshun’s parents saw the value of poetry, and his grandmother, Kaun’un, began instructing him around 
the age of twelve or thirteen to read poetry. Additionally, his youth was spent in the environs of Kamakura, 
where poets from the court frequently traveled. See Kawazoe 1964, pp. 30−33.
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duties. In fact, his poetic renown was undoubtedly one of the major reasons his friend 
Yoriyuki appointed him to the office of Kyushu tandai. Ryōshun, it should be noted, did 
not disappoint, using poetry and his connections to the poetry salons of the capital as a 
means of creating alliances with Kyushu warriors.13 His bloodline and experience combined 
with his literary talents made him the perfect tool for spreading Ashikaga authority to the 
rusticated island of Kyushu, a living bearer of civilization in an inhospitable land thirsty for 
culture.
Kyushu had proven a particularly stubborn obstacle to Ashikaga rule. Long resistant 
to central authority, it was riven by the squabbles of indigenous warriors unaccustomed 
to external leadership. The situation was further complicated by the presence of Southern 
Court partisans led by Prince Kaneyoshi 懐良親王 (1329?−83), one of Go-Daigo’s oldest 
living sons. Kaneyoshi, who arrived but a child in Kyushu in 1336, had done an admirable 
job solidifying his authority there as he matured; indeed, the Ashikaga had tried four 
times to subjugate the island, with each attempt ending in failure.14 While Kaneyoshi 
and warlords such as the Kikuchi and Shimazu proved stubborn foes, it is a testament to 
Ryōshun’s political and military acumen that by the late 1380s he had subjugated most of 
the island.
Ryōshun’s writings indicate that he was less than thrilled at the prospect of traveling to 
rural Kyushu, a place long on violence but short on literary talent. Moreover, since ancient 
times it had been the destination for individuals who were “awarded” positions in the imperial 
court’s Kyushu outpost Dazaifu 太宰府 that in reality were forms of exile. His travel diary 
Michiyukiburi 道行きぶり (Meetings on the Road), written in 1371 as he traveled to Kyushu, 
aptly expresses his sorrow at having to leave the capital.15 As the term michiyuki 道行き was 
associated with exile and death, use of that term and the lachrymose tone of the work both 
strongly suggest that he saw his mission as the death of his poetic aspirations.16 His willingness 
to sacrifice his dream of a career in poetics for the sake of his Ashikaga overlords more than 
anything illustrates the nature of his ideas on loyalty, to which we now turn.
Part 2: Building Bridges—Ryōshun, Kyushu, and Ashikaga Hegemony
Until Go-Daigo’s Kenmu Restoration, warrior interests were tied inextricably to the hege-
mony of the imperial court, but with the fall of the Kenmu imperium in 1336 that imperial 
authority fragmented. And yet few if any warriors desired, let alone thought about, autonomy 
from the court. The Ashikaga, especially Takauji’s younger brother Tadayoshi, struggled 
to reestablish central authority in the wake of Kenmu’s fall, supporting the Jimyōin 持明院 
imperial bloodline that gave them their legitimacy. The Kenmu formulary (Kenmu shikimoku 
13 See chapter 7, Kawazoe 1964.
14 Kawazoe 1964, pp. 76−83; Conlan 2003, pp. 157−58.
15 It may be that Ryōshun is simply following the well-worn trope from court literature of expressing sadness 
when departing the capital, but such tropes were parts of an archive that medieval Japanese drew on to aid 
them in expressing themselves. In any event, two passages will suffice to make the point about Ryōshun’s 
melancholy: “Though arriving now at Settsu province’s Akutagawa river, I feared what would happen to my 
dust-like existence”; and: “if in this early morning departure my sleeve was moistened by drops of water from 
an oar while crossing the [Katsura] river, I am made aware of how much more so [it will be] on the far road to 
Awaji” (Inada 1992, p. 4).
16 O’Neill 1973.
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建武式目) and its addenda (tsuikahō 追加法) reveal the Ashikaga to have been conservative 
and reactionary, desirous of establishing another shogunate to serve the court much as the 
Hōjō had done during the regency of Hōjō Yasutoki 北条泰時 (1183−1242), promulgator of 
the Goseibai formulary (Goseibai shikimoku 御成敗式目).17 Few warriors could have predicted 
the scale of Go-Daigo’s reforms, and in the end it was his rejection of a strong organ of war-
rior government that prompted the Ashikaga brothers to rebel.
Despite their relative success, a number of competing interests rendered the Ashikaga 
unable to fully establish their authority across the archipelago. Without a strong central 
authority, tozama warlords found it easier than ever to sell their services to the highest 
bidder, resulting in an unstable milieu wherein the strong—usually shugo daimyo—
devoured the weak, a terrifying reality considering Japan was ruled by men for whom 
violence was the rule, not the exception. Preventing such a development was behind the 
decision to send Ryōshun to Kyushu.
Understanding how Ryōshun tried to use tighter bonds of loyalty to forge a connection 
between Kyushu and Kyoto requires a general appreciation of just how fragile bonds 
between lords and followers were during Japan’s medieval period. The medieval concept 
of loyalty is best defined by the term chūsetsu 忠節, which is typically translated as service, 
in order to emphasize its contractual nature. Vassalage was built upon the foundations of 
mutual benefit, or a contract of debt (go’on 御恩) and service, wherein the most generous 
lords were more likely to prevail over their peers.18 Service can thus be characterized by its 
conditionality and flexibility and loyalty by its connotations of permanency and impersonal 
obligation.19 Loyalty in the unconditional sense was a later phenomenon, beginning with its 
transformation from an expression of a warrior’s self-determination ( jiriki kyūsai 自力救済) 
into the impersonal sort demanded by the rigid chain of command necessary for the great 
military campaigns of the sixteenth century, and culminating in what I term the age of 
unconditional loyalty that was the Tokugawa period.20 
Ryōshun seems to have accurately diagnosed the conditional nature of service as 
inimical to socio-political stability, the title of shugo and his own service as a shogunal 
administrator giving him unique insight into the general concerns of warriors and how they 
viewed service.21 He would have been acutely aware of the voracious appetite warriors had 
for lands and other emoluments, and hence understood that any hegemonic state would 
need to acknowledge and use that desire as the carrot that would help avoid, as much as 
possible, reliance on the stick.
Important here is that Ryōshun and his father appear to have considered self-sacrifice 
for a greater good an integral component of the lord-follower pact.22 This is noteworthy 
in the age of conditional loyalty, when getting as much as one could for as little effort as 
17 Grossberg 1981a, pp. 7, 15−16; Goble 1996, p. 263.
18 Ikegami 1997, p. 26.
19 Conlan 2003, pp. 143−44; Friday 2004, pp. 59−61; Hurst 1990, pp. 516−23.
20 Ikegami 1997, pp. 86−94.
21 For instance, Ryōshun used his understanding of warrior greed to manipulate kokujin ikki 国人一揆
associations into joining him to defeat his foes in Kyushu, most importantly the Shimazu. See Kawazoe 1964, 
pp. 61−70, 155−60.
22 “My father believed his action to be a great service, and the fact that he thought to put an end to a matter 
of great significance by sacrificing one of his children is not a secret, yet it is not recorded in the Taiheiki.” 
See Hasegawa 2008, p. 31. And as Conlan notes, “Not that death was a matter of great fear, because to die 
gloriously in battle meant that one’s descendants would receive great rewards” (Conlan 2003, pp. 44−45).
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possible was the rule, not the exception. Nan Taiheiki ’s account of the conflict between 
Hosokawa Kiyouji 細川清氏 (?−1362) and the second Ashikaga shogun Yoshiakira clearly 
illustrate Ryōshun’s ideas on the matter. It was whispered that Kiyouji harbored rebellious 
intentions and plans were made for his extirpation. And even though Ryōshun and his 
father Norikuni believed Kiyouji innocent of the charges, Norikuni put forth a plan to 
Yoshiakira whereby Kiyouji would be invited to Kyoto. There, Ryōshun would kill Kiyouji. 
Presumably, he would go along with his father’s plan despite the fact that he and Kiyouji 
were friends.23 While Ryōshun does express exasperation at his father’s secrecy, he does not 
refute or criticize his father’s decision.24 In short, Norikuni put the public peace first and 
planned to sacrifice his son and a potentially innocent man to maintain it, while Ryōshun 
was willing to pursue a plan that could end up in his own death as the price for peace.
Sometimes sacrifice took the form of restraint. In this regard Ryōshun had a good 
model in Norikuni, who in his youth refused to inherit the Imagawa chieftainship despite 
his father’s wish that he “should inherit everything.”25 In Ryōshun’s case, he was one of 
the few shugo who resisted the temptation to pillage his province for extra wealth, instead 
using the office to extend Ashikaga authority rather than his own.26 In short, self-sacrifice 
formed the basis for Ryōshun’s goal of connecting Kyushu to Kyoto via a state-centric form 
of service.27 Indeed, connecting the provinces to Kyoto necessitated a variety of new and 
unique measures.28
While in Kyushu, Ryōshun attempted to yoke warriors to the Ashikaga by creating 
a three-tiered hierarchy with a clear dialectic: those for the Ashikaga shoguns and those 
against, with himself as intermediary.29 In a way, we might say that Ryōshun was trying to 
convert tozama warlords into miuchi 身内 of the Ashikaga. The latter were linked to their 
lord through blood, tradition, or both, and were thus generally more loyal than their tozama 
counterparts.30 Ryōshun felt he could stabilize Kyushu by convincing its most powerful 
tozama warlords to become closely tied vassals of the Ashikaga. His intermediary role had 
precedent: in a sense he was setting himself up as a sort of neo-zuryō 受領, or bridging 
figure, whose presence would ensure the loyalty of Kyushu warriors and thus the stability of 
the island.
To that end he began by forging alliances with three of Kyushu’s greatest warlords, 
Shōni Fuyusuke 少弐冬資 (?−1375), Ōtomo Chikayo 大友親世 (?−1418) and Shimazu Ujihisa 
島津氏久 (1328−87), as well as with ikki 一揆 (of one mind) warrior alliances throughout 
Kyushu. The latter were the men of the provinces (kokujin 国人) who swore loyalty to the 
shogun and vowed to treat Ryōshun as the shogun’s official representative. In return, they 
23 Regarding Kiyouji, Ryōshun says, “I do not believe Kiyouji truly had any ambitions. Someone slandered him, 
having thoughts to rise beyond his station and go against the wishes of the shogun” (Hasegawa 2006, p. 33).
24 gongo dōdan no koto nariki 言語同断の事なりき (Hasegawa 2008, p. 31).
25 Hasegawa 2006, p. 438.
26 Kawazoe 1964, pp. 70−74.
27 “[Hegemony] mainly refers to a situation of subordination of both individuals and groups. Subordination 
entails a relation of domination by which the subjects are deprived of their self-reliance as persons as well as 
citizens. It denotes a factual condition of powerlessness and a representation of oneself as an impotent hostage 
in the hands of an ineffable destiny” (Urbinati 1998, p. 370).
28 For instance, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu installed a prototype of the sankin kōtai 参勤交代 system used to keep 
daimyo in check during the Tokugawa period. See Grossberg 1981a, pp. 5−6.
29 Kawazoe 1964, pp. 146−48.
30 Conlan 2003, pp. 130−40, 164.
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were accorded vassal (gokenin 御家人) status, which gave them a distinct advantage over their 
non gokenin peers.31 For Ryōshun, their swearing to serve the shogun was paramount for his 
goal—he continually stressed his role as shogunal intermediary in letters to them—whereas 
kokujin were motivated by the authority they gained vis-à-vis their rivals.32
Time would prove that Ryōshun had just the right mix of idealism and pragmatism 
to make things work. By the late 1380s Kyushu was mostly under his control, though he 
experienced some bumps along the way.33 Take the well-known example of Shōni Fuyusuke. 
Fuyusuke used his relationship with Ryōshun to mobilize local warriors, unilaterally 
appropriating lands in order to improve his position vis-à-vis other Kyushu warriors. Such 
shortsighted but entirely predictable acts hindered Ryōshun’s progress. Worse still, Fuyusuke 
was rumored to be seeking an alliance with the Southern Court after Ryōshun checked his 
attempt. Ryōshun’s hierarchy could not countenance such disobedience, prompting him 
to have his younger brother Nakaaki cut down Fuyusuke at a banquet. Perhaps Ryōshun 
assumed that his victory over Prince Kaneyoshi would have convinced these warlords of 
the value of his policy and that such an extreme gesture would make his point clear; on the 
contrary, it caused the Ōtomo and the Shimazu to lose faith in him, and in the short term 
hindered his progress toward regional hegemony.34
Even though tozama warlords resisted the notion that their allegiance was compulsory, 
Ryōshun’s ability to discern and utilize tozama and kokujin self-interest as a means of linking 
them to the shogunate was outstanding and led to his overall success in Kyushu, something 
achieved by none of the tandai before or after him. This undoubtedly reinforced his belief 
that peace was the natural consequence of a hierarchy in which lords and independent 
warriors were joined in a bond reminiscent of that existing between lords and their miuchi 
followers. Sadly, he would come to realize that his dreams of peace were just that, for his 
success bred a number of foes ready to pounce the moment he revealed any weakness. That 
moment would come in 1395, when the septuagenarian general was summarily dismissed 
from the post of tandai and recalled to the capital.
Part 3: Burning Bridges—Ryōshun, Yoshimitsu, and the Ōei Disturbance
The stage would be set for Ryōshun’s downfall in 1392, when the political situation changed 
following the death of Hosokawa Yoriyuki and the surrender of the Southern Court. The 
Ōtomo and Ōuchi families both had designs on the office of Kyushu tandai. Though 
ostensibly allied with Ryōshun, they had long resented the intrusion of external powers and 
worked behind the scenes to weaken him.35 In Kyoto, struggles over the office of shogunal 
31 Harrington 1985, p. 87. The members of the ikki swore a “god water pact” (shinsui keijō 神水契状),  in which 
the principals wrote out an oath, burnt it, mixed it with water and drank it. See Kawazoe 1964, pp. 141−44.
32 Harrington 1985, p. 86.
33 The Shōni and the Shimazu had been thorns in Ryōshun’s side since he murdered Fuyusuke in 1375. 
However, he had mostly conquered the Shōni by 1387 and Shimazu Ujihisa, one of Ryōshun’s greatest foes 
in Kyushu, passed away in the same year, leaving little in the way of major resistance. See Kawazoe 1964, pp. 
155−60.
34 Conlan 2003, p. 163.
35 Ryōshun appears to have been aware of their skullduggery: “Unfortunately, the recent events and those of 
Kyushu were entirely Ōuchi’s doing, as well as the reason behind my being recalled [from Kyushu]. Speaking 
on this matter, the folk of Kyushu believed me to be partial and dishonest and thus avoided me because the 
shogun’s will went against their expectations” (Hasegawa 2008, pp. 46−48).
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regent witnessed a changing of the guard when 
Shiba Yoshiyuki 斯波義将 (1350−1410) became 
shogunal regent after Yoriyuki’s death.36 No doubt 
related to this, a member of the Shibukawa family 
named Mitsuyori 満頼, a cousin of Yoshimitsu’s 
and related to Yoshiyuki by marriage, assumed 
that position after Ryōshun’s dismissal.37 It was a 
sudden reversal of fortune, as only a few months 
prior he had been given a document tacit ly 
reinforcing his authority over Kyushu.38
Looking back, Ryōshun’s dismissal should 
not be surprising. Ashikaga Yoshimitsu’s reign was 
marked by an autocratic approach and a consistent 
arrogation of authority at the expense of other 
powerful warlords, especially those of the shugo 
class, who had vast opportunities to garner wealth 
and largesse by using the half-tax (hanzei 半済) 
laws that the shogunate had implemented first in 1352 and then more broadly in 1368. 
This was essential to fashioning hierarchies of authority that would mark the rise of the 
shugo daimyo and later, the sengoku daimyo during the realpolitik of the sixteenth century 
often referred to by the term gekokujō 下剋上, or the “low overturning the high.”39 It is 
worth noting that Ryōshun himself used this technique liberally in his attempts to solidify 
control of Kyushu, which in the long run could not have endeared him to Yoshimitsu.40
While Yoshimitsu might have feared shugo who achieved autonomy, what he truly 
dreaded were blood relatives who possessed both autonomy and symbolic capital, making 
them potential rivals. Ryōshun was related to the Ashikaga and a shugo, and as Kyushu 
tandai had an island of quarrelsome warriors potentially at his disposal. In short, he was the 
most dangerous sort of foe for any would-be hegemony.
Yoshimitsu was not entirely out of bounds in dismissing Ryōshun. Exigency had 
compelled him to exploit his rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis distributing rewards in order 
to gather followers—the aforementioned hanzei was one of his primary techniques, and one 
common to shugo of the time.41 First, even though Ryōshun was forced to adopt such tactics 
due to lack of resources, one can see how Yoshimitsu might have assumed the worst: he was 
36 Yoshiyuki is also read as Yoshimasa.
37 The Shibukawa family, incidentally, was one of those originally sent to subjugate Kyushu prior to Ryōshun, 
who complains about the Shibukawa at the end of Nan Taiheiki. See Hasegawa 2008, pp. 47−48.
38 This document had seven conditions, and gave Ryōshun more latitude in adjudicating warrior land claims 
and suits. The fourth, however, reveals the degree of the Ashikaga’s mistrust of Ryōshun, for it divested him 
of his authority to award kanjō 感状 (documents of appreciation for service). Such documents were critical 
for retaining a follower’s fealty, and without them he was unable to give official, personal thanks for warrior 
service, a valuable tool Ryōshun had relied on to build relationships during his tenure. As one can imagine, 
receiving such documents was a great honor, as well as a way that a warlord with the proper credentials (such 
as Ryōshun) and ambitions to carve out a sphere of autonomy might entice warriors to his cause. In short, 
while bolstering his ability to act as their representative, the Ashikaga had simultaneously denuded him of 
one of his most valuable tools for maintaining his personal authority. See Harrington 1985, p. 89; Kawazoe 
1964, pp. 209−211.
39 Wintersteen 1974, pp. 214−20.
40 Harrington 1985, pp. 87−88.
41 Harrington 1985, pp. 85−91.
Figure 2. Portrait of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu. 
Courtesy of Rokuonji temple.
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far removed from the realities of Ryōshun’s situation and was worried about losing his grip on 
the ever-recalcitrant shugo class. Second, Yoshimitsu lived in the harsh political maelstrom of 
Kyoto and was therefore subject to political machinations about which Ryōshun would have 
had scant knowledge and even less potential to influence. Third, Yoshimitsu had little personal 
contact with Ryōshun during the latter’s time in Kyushu, a prerequisite for developing trust 
between warriors in the age of conditional loyalty. Finally, it certainly could not have helped 
that a number of Kyushu warriors had their own agendas and slandered Ryōshun to further 
their own interests, undoubtedly inf luencing Yoshimitsu’s opinion. Taking all this into 
account, it is unlikely that Yoshimitsu would have perceived Ryōshun’s actions as motivated 
by fidelity, even though his track record as a public official, his testimony in Nan Taiheiki, and 
the personal qualities evident in the Letter, paint him as a man of high ideals. The question we 
must now confront is why he contemplated rebellion, and furthermore, why he disavowed his 
participation when evidence suggests he did actually participate.
In addition to his dismissal from the post of tandai, two events in particular appear 
to have convinced Ryōshun that Yoshimitsu needed to be deposed. First, he planned to 
meet directly with Yoshimitsu and defend himself against the slander of his Kyushu foes, 
hoping that his years of service would earn him an audience. In this he was disappointed, 
as Yoshimitsu refused the meeting.42 If this was vexing, worse yet was Ryōshun’s nephew 
Yasunori 康範 convincing Yoshimitsu to award him half of Ryōshun’s hereditary landholding 
of Suruga province. Previously, Hosokawa Yoriyuki had refused Yasunori’s request, citing a 
“lack of precedent”;43 Yoshimitsu, however, acquiesced to Yasunori’s request, emboldening the 
latter to request Tōtōmi 遠江 province as well. Yasunori’s behavior and Yoshimitsu’s biased 
adjudication demoralized Ryōshun.44 The desire of the shogun in the east (Kantō kubō 関東
公方) Ashikaga Ujimitsu 足利氏満 and later his son Mitsukane 満兼 (1378−1409) to become 
shogun would provide Ryōshun with an opportunity to settle the score.45
Following the death of Ujimitsu in 1398, his son Mitsukane and Ōuchi Yoshihiro 
plotted to rebel against the Ashikaga. Mitsukane, like his father, possessed the bloodline, 
symbolic capital, wealth, and power base to threaten Yoshimitsu’s rule. 
Yoshihiro, on the other hand, was a great power in Kyushu who aspired to control 
the island. Like Ryōshun, he was a contributor to the establishment of Ashikaga authority, 
defeating Yamana Ujikiyo 山名氏清 (1344−92) in the Meitoku Disturbance of 1391. 
He participated in the defeat of a Southern Court army later that year, and in the 
following year convinced the Southern Court to relinquish the imperial regalia, thereby 
42 “I thought that I could put Yoshimitsu at ease over the matter of Kyushu if I could just go to the capital 
and clear everything up, but in the end he would not listen to me, likely because those in Kyushu had long 
whispered of my dishonesty” (Hasegawa 2008, p. 46).
43 yo no tameshi ni koso mōseshi ga 世の例にこそ申せしが (Hasegawa 2008, p. 28).
44 Ryōshun laments: “Oh, if only Yasunori had not requested Suruga province, we would not have experienced 
sorrow at such duplicity” (Hasegawa 2008, p. 28).
45 A short note on the acrimony between the shogun in Kyoto and his counterpart in Kamakura, the Kantō 
kubō, is in order. Regarding the latter, Ryōshun discussed its origins at length in Nan Taiheiki. Ashikagas 
Takauji and Tadayoshi foresaw the potential for abuses and uprisings and hoped that ceding the east to 
Ashikaga Motouji, the fourth of Takauji’s sons, would prevent chicanery by other members of the Ashikaga 
family, as well as by other powerful individuals, primarily those of the shugo class. They were mistaken, for 
while the Kantō kubō was meant to bolster the shogun’s authority in the east, members of the Ashikaga who 
filled the post would almost certainly use it as a stepping-stone to further autonomy. Animosity between the 
shogun and the Kantō kubō persisted until Ashikaga Shigeuji 足利成氏 abandoned the post in 1455. For 
Ryōshun’s account in Nan Taiheiki, see Hasegawa 2008, pp. 38−39.
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affecting its surrender. Despite Yoshihiro’s dedicated service, 
the Ōeiki 応永記 (Record of Ōei) states that he decided to 
raise the standard of rebellion because it was rumored that 
Yoshimitsu had ordered his destruction. And when Yoshimitsu 
sent the monk Zekkai Chūshin 絶海中津 (1334−1405) to 
treat with Yoshihiro, he explained three grievances behind his 
decision to rebel.46 While appearing reasonable, Yoshimitsu, 
desiring to curtail the authority of shugo like Yoshihiro, refused 
to relent. Thus Yoshihiro set out for battle on 13 October 1399, 
but he was quickly defeated and forced to commit suicide on 
21 December 1399. His erstwhile co-conspirator Mitsukane 
surrendered soon after, bringing the so-called Ōei Disturbance 
to a premature end.
Yoshimitsu, wanting to become the locus 
of political power, could not countenance 
the relinquishing of authority to anyone, 
and men like Ryōshun and Yoshihiro who 
helped establish that authority now threatened 
his rule and had thus become expendable. 
Yoshimitsu’s dreams of grandeur even led him 
to consider what others before him such as 
Taira no Kiyomori had considered: adoption 
into or supplanting of the imperial family. Post 
retirement Yoshimitsu would take the title 
of chancellor of the realm (dajō daijin 太政
大臣) and demand rights accorded a retired 
emperor, with the goal of either marrying his 
children into the imperial line or supplanting 
it entirely.47 It was such lofty dreams that 
brought him into conflict with collaterals and 
shugo alike.
Warriors had long found the dictatorial 
approach unpalatable: the f irst shogunate 
had been founded on the premise that it was 
a conglomeration of competing warrior interests. Minamoto Yoritomo 源頼朝 (1147−99) 
struggled to balance those interests and did not seek to become a dictator. The shogunal 
ideal was the very opposite, in fact: their lordship was predicated on munificence and 
judiciousness. Even members of the court disliked despotism. Kitabatake Akiie 北畠顕家 
(1318−38), one of Go-Daigo’s ablest commanders and son of the renowned Southern Court 
46 First, it was rumored that Yoshimitsu had ordered the Ōuchi’s enemies, the Shōni and the Kikuchi, to kill 
him; second there was, Yoshimitsu’s attainder of a number of Yoshihiro’s provinces; and third was the lack of 
rewards for his son, who had died in battle with the Shōni at Yoshimitsu’s behest. See Ōeiki, pp. 303−304.
47 Yoshimitsu’s intent has been much debated. Some see him as arrogating imperial prerogative as a means of 
trying to become emperor. See Yamamura and Imatani 1992, pp. 69−74. Others like Conlan believe that 
because Yoshimitsu was treated as an emperor that he was in effect emperor. See Conlan 2011b, pp. 171−86.
Figure 3. Kaō 花押 (autograph 
sea l) of Ashikaga Mitsukane. 
Mochizuki Kakusen, Kaō tsuzuri, 
kaō sōran 花押つづり・花押総覧. 
http://homepage2.nifty.com/kaou/
souran/e-kaou/kaou-s/kaou-s04.
html. Viewed 30 September 2015.
Figure 4. Portrait of Ōuchi Yoshihiro. Rekishi 
jinbutsu gazō dētabēsu 歴史人物画像データベース. 
Available online at Kokubungaku Kenkyū Shiryōkan 
国文学研究資料館.
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leader Kitabatake Chikafusa 北畠親房 (1293−1354), harshly remonstrated with Go-Daigo 
for his maladministration, laying out seven points that contributed to unrest, almost all of 
which were also hallmarks of Yoshimitsu’s administration.48 Responses toward autocratic 
governance were also harsh, marked by remonstrance, retirement, or rebellion. We should 
not be surprised at the similarities: both Ryōshun and Chikafusa were prominent Confucian 
intellectuals, and Akiie’s intellectual makeup resembled his father’s.49 Their common 
background would mark the way in which each resisted his respective leader’s turn toward 
despotism.
On the surface, the Ōei Disturbance appears a simple conflict between Yoshimitsu and 
an upstart family member allied with a disgruntled warlord. Ryōshun informs us in Nan 
Taiheiki that Yoshihiro, afraid his land rights would be subject to attainder, tried to recruit 
him. However, Ryōshun insists he refused the offer.50 We should not accept uncritically his 
explanation, however, as other evidence suggests that his actions may not have been so black 
and white.51 First, it seems that Ryōshun acted as go-between for Yoshihiro and Mitsukane 
at some point in 1398 or early 1399.52 Second, after Yoshimitsu ordered Ryōshun’s death, 
he mobilized family members and followers with the intent to rebel, though he surrendered 
soon after.53 And third, Ryōshun claims he subsequently retired to his home in Fujisawa 
because he came to believe that Mitsukane did not think to revolt for the sake of the 
realm.54 This last is most important, for it suggests not only that Ryōshun chose the 
traditional Confucian method of remonstrance through retirement, but also that he wanted 
to follow a man of conviction who would “preserve for all time the fortunes of the Ashikaga 
and give stability to the people.”55
Perhaps we have been posing the wrong question when we ask why Ryōshun might 
betray. Perhaps the better question is this: what if he did not believe he was guilty of an act 
of betrayal? As Kitamura Masayuki has argued, Ryōshun was no stranger to reinterpreting 
the definition of betrayal, so we should consider the possibility that he did not believe he 
was betraying the Ashikaga, but deposing a bad ruler—Yoshimitsu, the man who had fallen 
from what Ryōshun saw as the “way of heaven” (tendō 天道).56 Nan Taiheiki presents the 
following excoriation of Yoshimitsu:
48 In order: 1) lack of concern for the North and Kyushu; 2) exorbitant taxes; 3) improper advancements of 
court rank; 4) unfair distribution of land awards; 5) extreme sumptuary expenditures; 6) unfair application 
of laws; and 7) a reliance on individuals interested in self gain. See section titled “Restoration’s Setback” 
(“Shinsei no zasetsu” 新政の挫折) in Satō 1965.
49 Marra 1985, pp. 330−36.
50 “Why should you lose your provinces and lands if together we continue to serve Yoshimitsu with greater loyalty?” 
(Hasegawa 2008, p. 46).
51 Ryōshun seems to suggest that he at least agreed with Ujimitsu, Mitsukane’s father, on the matter of 
Yoshimitsu’s immorality. For example: “As for recent events, we decided when we went to Tōtōmi only to 
look up to someone from among the Ashikaga who we believed would pursue correct government, since this 
was Lord Takauji’s wish” (Hasegawa 2008, p. 39).
52 Kamakura ōzōshi  鎌倉大草子 clearly states that Ryōshun was disgruntled due to Yoshimitsu’s handling of 
things and eventually capitulated to Yoshihiro’s invitations. Kawazoe 1964, pp. 224−25.
53 An entry in Sondō shinnō gyōjō 尊道親王行状 for 4 July 1400 reads: “The foes in Tōtōmi, Kunai no shōbu 
nyūdō and Hoshino, were defeated, and Imagawa Iyo nyūdō [Ryōshun] surrendered” (Kawazoe 1964, pp. 
228−29).
54 sate wa Kamakura dono no, tenka no tame ni hitasura oboshimeshitatsu koto wa nakari keri to zonji shikaba 偖は
鎌倉殿の、天下の為に混思召立事はなかりけりと存じしかば (Hasegawa 2008, p. 39).
55 gotōke go’un chōkyū to ii, bannin, ando o nasu beki ni ya to omou narishi nari 御当家御運長久と云ひ、万人、安堵
をなすべきにやと思ふなりしなり (Hasegawa 2008, p. 38).
56 Kitamura 2010, pp. 16−21.
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At the time, Ashikaga Mitsukane lamented that “Yoshimitsu’s government was biased 
toward certain people, and so some powerful individual might in the end surface to 
steal the realm [from the Ashikaga]; would it not be better [to have it taken by someone 
in the family] than some unrelated individual?” The concept of “rebellion for the sake 
of the realm and its people” is widely accepted. Had Yoshimitsu changed his mind 
entirely—even had he not focused wholly on good government—why would such 
thoughts have occurred to Mitsukane if Yoshimitsu had but ceased his recent evils 
and waylessness, and instead worked toward quelling the people’s grievances? Lately 
everyone seems to speak of some grudge against Yoshimitsu, yet his destiny is strong 
and his authority is absolute. Accordingly, if his administration was correct even but a 
little, who indeed would have joined their hearts with Mitsukane?
Yoshimitsu even now commonly performs prayers out of fear, and it is rumored 
that maledictions for the subjugation of the Kantō are being performed. I believe that 
if he would do away with prayers and sorcery and concentrate even a little on how to 
govern properly, he would immediately realize the way of the realm and the hearts of the 
Kami and Buddhas [italics added].57
From Ryōshun’s point of view Yoshimitsu was trying to bring peace to the realm by appeas-
ing the kami and Buddhas through Shingon mysticism when his administrative experience 
and intellectual breadth told him that “the way of the realm,” which lay in quelling the 
people’s grievances, was more important.58
Nan Taiheiki’s language—in particular that in the passage above—carries a distinctly 
Chinese-Confucian tone that suggests that the “way of the realm” lay in respecting 
established social hierarchies. We know from his time in Kyushu that this was Ryōshun’s 
ideal.59 Moreover, he says he lost everything by acting in an “old-fashioned” spirit.60 For 
fourteenth century Japanese, the ideals of Chinese-style governance were ancient and perhaps 
seen as outdated, even if fresh currents had been coming into vogue.61 Still, the fact that such 
57 Hasegawa 2008, p. 35.
58 Conlan 2011b, pp. 177−80.
59 His ideas can be summed up with the following passage: “When I consider the circumstances, I exerted 
myself in vain because I foolishly thought of past connections and duty, and I lament having wasted the 
honor and wealth I accrued over long years. The truth about my time in Kyushu is simply that I did not 
know my place. Though I was not necessarily as favored by or as close as others to Yoshimitsu, I put my own 
concerns aside entirely and, having been ordered above all to pacify the west entrusted myself to that decision, 
all because I thought only to do my duty for the Ashikaga. Not in their wildest dreams did my followers 
think that I would lose hundreds of relatives and housemen, my honor, and now even my hereditary lands as 
a result. Men ought to perform loyal service according to their rank, for others will become resentful of those 
who perform service above their station” (Hasegawa 2008, p. 40).
60 mukashigokoro nite 昔心にて. Though we do not have a record of the works Ryōshun studied throughout his 
life, he was one of the foremost Confucian scholars of his time, and thus we can inductively suggest that he 
was eminently familiar with most strains of Chinese political theory and their relationship to the intellectual 
climate of his time. Andrew Goble has two fascinating summaries of that climate. The first is in an article on 
Emperor Hanazono’s Kaitaishi sho 誡太子書 (Admonitions to the Crown Prince); the second is his monograph 
titled Kenmu: Go-Daigo’s Revolution. See Goble 1995; Goble 1996, pp. 20−29.
61 Some notable examples of individuals who approached Confucian learning from new angles include the 
Southern Court ideologue Kitabatake Chikafusa, who had a deep knowledge of Mencius. For him, the 
notions of “virtuous government” (tokusei 徳政) and “virtuous ruler, peaceful people” (kuntoku anmin 君徳
安民) were central. Madenokōji Nobufusa 万里小路宣房, who later joined the Northern Court, also relied on 
Mencian thought on revolutionary reign change (ekisei kakumei 易姓革命), wherein an immoral ruler could 
rightfully be destroyed by his followers, to criticize his former ruler Go-Daigo. Finally, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu 
himself heard lectures on Mencius from the famed Zen priest Gidō Shūshin 義堂周信. See Itō 1997, pp. 
62−63; Inoue 1972, pp. 266−83.
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ideals were rhetorically ancient but realistically distant would explain why his contemporaries 
ultimately rejected his hierarchical vision of the world as too alien from their reality.
Chinese-Confucian rhetoric formed the lexical and intellectual basis from which 
medieval Japanese drew ideas on governance, and so we should not be surprised that 
Ryōshun’s did too. Here I would like to posit that the basis of his thought regarding 
rebellion came from Mencius.62 While in Kyushu he commonly dealt with monks traveling 
to and from the continent.63 Such individuals were typically of the Five Mountains (gozan 
五山) Zen establishment, which was known for its reliance on Sung Neo-Confucianism, 
which had a special affinity for the moral arguments of Mencius.64 Some caution is required, 
for while Ryōshun explicitly refers to Mencius on several occasions in the Letter, there is no 
such mention in Nan Taiheiki. And yet he draws on ideas that bear striking similarities to 
three important Mencian notions: the “way of kings” (ōdō 王道), the “way of despots” (hadō 
覇道), and the “stability of the people” (banmin ando 万民安堵). The “way of kings” places 
great value on hierarchy, social harmony, and balancing the needs of the people, referred to 
by the phrase banmin ando. The “way of despots,” conversely, describes governance through 
selfishness, personal bias, and a lack of concern for established precedent and hierarchy, 
ultimately sowing discord among the people. In other words, the moral king was generous 
and worked to create harmony between clearly defined social tiers, while the despot merely 
aggrandized his own status and wealth regardless of precedent or custom, and often at the 
expense of the people. 
The suggestion of Ryōshun’s reliance on Mencius, toward which Japanese intellectuals had 
traditionally been hostile, is noteworthy, as Mencian rhetoric provided a way to justify both 
the Ashikaga’s conquest of the Southern Court and Ryōshun’s own distaste for, and rebellion 
against, Yoshimitsu’s regime. In the former case, the Ashikaga contributed to the defeat of 
an immoral ruler in Go-Daigo, while in the latter case Ryōshun could argue that deposing 
Yoshimitsu, whom he also considered an immoral ruler, was not a betrayal of the Ashikaga. 
If Ryōshun’s attempt at forging stronger bonds of loyalty presaged a new type of warrior 
hierarchy, then his concern with the Ashikaga house is also representative of an increased 
focus on the “primacy of the whole extended warrior house (rather than its members), with its 
history and its texts, as the repository of attachments and the object of loyalty.”65
Ryōshun also refers to other ideas based in Mencius, such as the “mandate of heaven” 
(tenmei 天命) and the “heaven’s heavenly way” (tenka no tenka taru michi 天下の天下た
る道), as a basis for his criticism of Yoshimitsu. Interestingly, the mandate of heaven, 
by which a lord’s reign was justified by heaven as long as peace and harmony prevailed, 
and “revolutionary reign change” (ekisei kakumei 易姓革命), which argued that a ruler 
who failed in that duty had lost said mandate and thus could be deposed, are explicit in 
Taiheiki.66 It may be that Ryōshun chose to target Taiheiki not just because it provided 
a means of correcting the historical record but also because he agreed with much of the 
62 As a Zen monk, Ryōshun had to be familiar with the intellectual trends of his sect. Zen, as it so happens, was 
the primary means by which Song Neo-Confucian thought, which prioritized Mencius, came to Japan. See 
Inoue 1972, pp. 217−32.
63 Kawazoe 1964, pp. 167−69.
64 Collcutt 1996, p. 97.
65 Spafford 2009, p. 322.
66 Mass 1998, pp. 328−30
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work’s viewpoint, which is distinctly Confucian in outlook.67 Ryōshun himself maintains 
that [Taiheiki’s] content is overall correct, despite the many falsehoods about the merit of 
various individuals.68 Could it be that Taiheiki was doubly important because his support 
of the main narrative provided a basis for his criticism of Yoshimitsu, who appeared to be 
following a similar path as Emperor Go-Daigo, whom Taiheiki also excoriates as a despot? It 
is an intriguing possibility that deserves further attention.
Another indicator of Ryōshun’s understanding of Mencius is his reference to the 
concept of heaven, earth, and man (ten chi jin 天地人). Mencius prioritizes man, stating that 
“Heaven’s seasons are less crucial than earth’s advantages and earth’s advantages less crucial 
than human accord.”69 In other words, man’s reason trumps the unpredictable vicissitudes 
of heaven, while at the same time the advantage of earth is entirely dependent on reason 
to ascertain the tactical advantages of terrain. Ryōshun echoes this theory as a means of 
conceptualizing Yoshimitsu’s faults:
Thinking of this in terms of the triad of Heaven, Earth, and Man, the advantage 
of heaven resides in dates and timing, auspicious directions, and the nature of an 
individual by birth; is not the advantage of heaven simply using what is beneficial? The 
advantage of earth is nothing more than placing impregnable mountains, seas, and 
other defensible areas to your front, as well as fortifying oneself in a good stronghold. 
The advantage of mankind is reason. Just as it is said that if the hearts of all people 
are in accordance with reason, then the advantages of heaven and earth will become 
unnecessary, if all the people of Japan give thanks for the blessings of their lord with 
one heart, then would even one villain be born? Then His Lordship’s prayers would be 
answered naturally. Though he seeks to accomplish deeds through prayer, what good 
will secret rites do if His Lordship’s mind is filled with evil and immorality?70
In other words, if Yoshimitsu had based his judgments on reason when considering merit 
and loyalty, rather than on transient advantages (as Ryōshun undoubtedly felt was the case 
when Yoshimitsu dismissed him from the post of Kyushu tandai), then the need to rely on 
heaven and earth would be obviated and society would naturally be at peace.
If Mencius was the fountainhead for Ryōshun’s criticism of Yoshimitsu, then it stands 
to reason that Mencius provided a justification for his participation in Mitsukane’s plot. 
Consider the following passage: 
We decided when we went to Tōtōmi only to put our trust in someone from among 
the Ashikaga whom we believed would pursue correct government, since this was Lord 
67 Mori Shigeaki believes that Taiheiki is ultimately a Confucian work. He has a point, in that it makes value 
judgments primarily through reference to Chinese history and Confucian morality, establishing both at the 
outset as the baseline for value judgments (Mori 1991, p. 17). Indeed, the introduction to Taiheiki lays out 
what is clearly a Confucian baseline for judging the morality of rulers, using Chinese parallels to outline 
ethical governance, a strategy that continues throughout the entire work. See Taiheiki ’s introduction in 
Hasegawa 1998, p. 19.
68 See note 5.
69 The line to which Ryōshun refers comes from book 2B of Mencius. For an English translation, see Bloom and 
Ivanhoe 2009, p. 38.
70 Hasegawa 2008, pp. 35−36.
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Takauji’s wish. But around the time when it was clear that a force would be sent from 
Kyoto, I heard that Uesugi strongly urged Ashikaga Mitsukane to make peace with 
Yoshimitsu. I knew then that Mitsukane did not think to revolt for the sake of the 
realm and so, respectful of Kyoto’s judgment, I retired of my own volition to Fujisawa 
and stayed there, thinking that my children should be of assistance to Yoshimitsu and 
Mitsukane.71
A reliance on Mencian thought as a justification for Ryōshun’s participation in rebellion is 
understandable, since what compelled him was not, as he says, “selfishness according to the 
times” (toki ni aeba hito no kashira o konomu 時に逢えば人の頭を尚む), but a moral impera-
tive to depose an immoral ruler. Using this rhetoric Ryōshun was able to work against 
Yoshimitsu while remaining loyal to the Ashikaga family.72 Casting rebellion in moral terms 
seems to have been a hallmark of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries when, as David 
Spafford argues, “the retrospective rational and self-serving omissions speak not only of a 
calculus of personal advantage, I contend, but of the murk and uncertainty of an age in 
which the rending of social fabric was an all-too-frequent possibility.”73 Ryōshun’s account 
in Nan Taiheiki reflects an acute awareness of the flexible nature of history and memory, and 
the ease with which they could be recast. 
Ryōshun’s criticism of Yoshimitsu is apparent: had the latter endeavored to earn the 
loyalty of powerful warriors through moral governance rather than by subjugating any and 
all who threatened him, he might have prevented rebellions like that of Mitsukane and 
Yoshihiro. For Ryōshun, the “mandate of heaven” and “revolutionary dynastic change” 
allowed for an immoral ruler such as Yoshimitsu to be deposed without endangering the 
Ashikaga dynasty. Hence Ryōshun did not consider his participation, whatever the degree, 
in the Ōei Disturbance as a betrayal, so much as an ethical action meant to save a society 
for which he had sacrificed so much to help build.
In the end, however, the rebellion failed and he was forced to retire. Ryoshun’s life was 
spared when the Kantō deputy Uesugi Norisada 上杉憲定 (1375−1413) and, oddly enough, 
the aforementioned monk-turned-layman Yasunori interceded with Yoshimitsu on Ryoshun’s 
behalf.74 His bridges burnt with Yoshimitsu’s regime, he retired with little left but his literary 
reputation, devoting the remainder of his life to poetry and literary criticism and remaining 
apart from the political realm of the Ashikaga that he helped forge.
71 Hasegawa 2008, p. 39.
72 The following passage will suffice to make the point: “Because Yoshimitsu’s government was biased toward 
certain people, some powerful individual might in the end surface to steal the realm from the Ashikaga; 
would it not be better [to have it taken by someone in the family] than some unrelated individual” (Hasegawa 
2008, p. 35).
73 Spafford 2009, pp. 322−23.
74 Kawazoe 1964, pp. 229−30.
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Conclusion
I have argued that Ryōshun’s time as Kyushu tandai ref lects his attempt to create an 
Ashikaga hegemony to instill order on a society deteriorating into chaos. Integral to this was 
bridging the gap between private lordship and public by fostering a relationship with inde-
pendent warlords reminiscent of the ties they had with their miuchi followers. This method 
is representative of that which sengoku daimyo and the Tokugawa after them would use to 
fashion hierarchies of authority. It is clear then that even as early as the fourteenth century 
warlords understood that the greatest guarantor of stability was restricting the autonomy 
of one’s followers. While Ryōshun’s method presaged later attempts to foster and maintain 
order, his goal was fundamentally conservative: reinforcing the current central authority 
while preserving what little order remained. However, his conservative nature put him at 
odds with Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, whose absolutist tendencies would not allow collaterals a 
place at the political table. Yoshimitsu’s despotism caused Ryōshun to consider rebellion, a 
decision he was able to justify through Mencius. Mencius’ notion of reign change allowed 
Ryōshun to criticize his lord’s immorality, while still supporting the Ashikaga dynasty.
Ryōshun was remembered mostly because his Letter espoused behavior that was easily 
understood as moral according to Tokugawa period ideals. However, his Nan Taiheiki sheds 
light on an altogether different side of his personality: that of the disgruntled rebel. If I am 
correct that the ethics of Mencius gave him ideological justification to rebel, his outlook was 
ironically consonant with the predominant ideology of the Tokugawa, who, because they 
were concerned primarily with controlling the obstreperous warrior class, were justifiably 
sensitive to reign change.75 Ideologues and loyalists of the time, heavily influenced by Neo-
Confucian ideals and interested in simple narratives of loyalty and rebellion, especially 
regarding the fourteenth century and the schism between the two imperial courts, would 
have been eminently uncomfortable with disloyalty on the part of a man considered a 
paragon of warrior ethics. Thus it is no surprise that any evidence implicating Ryōshun as 
a rebel, even one with a just cause, would have been ignored by those who lived in an era 
hungry for exemplars, real or imagined.
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